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Abstract  
This chapter examines the level of differentiated integration and its consequences in 
relation to asylum matters in the EU, focusing in particular on the position of the UK. 
It identifies a distinction between ‘formal differentiation’ and ‘informal flexibility’. 
Formal differentiation includes the official agreements concluded with the UK, Ire-
land and Denmark allowing these countries to participate or not to participate in asy-
lum measures to pre-determined degrees. Informal flexibility results from uneven or 
mal-implementation, which is to some extent tolerated by the EU Institutions. This 
chapter argues that at the heart of a harmonisation project is the necessity for the limi-
tation of the discretion of participating Member States to legislate differently in a spe-
cific area, and this is particularly important with regard to the EU’s asylum project 
because of the persistence of the Dublin Regulation’s ‘one chance of asylum’ rule. 
Asylum is not only a field which directly affects the lives of vulnerable individuals, 
but is heavily regulated by international and human rights norms. It is therefore ques-
tionable whether there should be any provision for formal flexibility arrangements. 
Under current arrangements the UK is in practice permitted to cherry-pick in a highly 
selective manner, participating in the Dublin system for instance, but refusing to be 
bound by the legally enforceable minimum standards legislation which arguably 
comprise one of the few safeguards attached to the Dublin system. Furthermore, the 
widespread uneven implementation across the EU among Member States bound by 
the asylum directives constitutes a high level of informal flexibility, putting in jeop-
ardy the protection of asylum seekers. This tension puts a question mark over the ex-
tent to which the project of harmonisation of asylum systems can sustain both the ex-
isting formal differentiation arrangements and informal flexibility. 
Introduction 
Since the EU has expanded, both in size and competence, differentiation in levels of 
willingness to integrate and in political, socio-economic and cultural terms has be-
come an increasingly prominent feature.  According to Monar differentiation in rela1 -
tion to immigration and asylum matters “has emerged primarily in order to allow for 
the pursuit of a ‘deepening’ of integration in circumstances in which the full participa-
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tion of some countries is not possible”.  Maria Fletcher has observed that for the EU, 2
as a “flexible and evolving legal order”, there is “a fine line between the stagnating 
impact of accommodating too little and the fragmenting impact of accommodating too 
much diversity”.  Fletcher has argued that CJEU judgements along with Lisbon’s opt 3
in/out protocols suggest that the EU places “a more explicit emphasis on incentivising 
maximum participation and disincentivising a ‘pick and choose’ and ‘free rider’ men-
tality to flexibility”.  This chapter argues that the field of asylum should be entirely 4
free from differentiated integration arrangements. In being a field of law which direct-
ly affects the rights of individuals in a context in which their physical survival and 
psychological wellbeing is at risk, the field of asylum is unlike other competences of 
the EU where there is scope for differentiated integration. 
The chapter’s focus is the UK, a Member State with a flexible opt-in in relation to 
asylum and immigration matters. The chapter identifies a distinction between formal 
differentiation and informal flexibility, both of which can be conceived of as differen-
tiation that is provided for in the field of asylum. Formal differentiated integration 
entails the official agreements concluded with the UK, Ireland and Denmark, which 
either enable or exclude participation of these countries in asylum matters to prede-
termined degrees. These formal arrangements have serious consequences for the in-
tegrity of the EU’s asylum system. Under current arrangements the UK is in practice 
permitted to cherry-pick in a highly selective manner, participating in the Dublin sys-
tem for instance, but refusing to be bound by the legally enforceable minimum stan-
dards legislation which arguably comprise one of the few safeguards that might miti-
gate the potential for harm in the ‘one chance of asylum’ rule.  
Informal flexibility describes the EU’s tolerance of uneven or mal-implementation of 
agreed asylum standards. At Tampere in 1999, the European Council agreed ‘to work 
towards establishing a Common European Asylum System [CEAS], based on the full 
and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention, thus ensuring that nobody is sent 
back to persecution, ie maintaining the principle of non-refoulement’.  In its effort to 5
create a CEAS, whereby the same minimum standards of protection and procedures 
apply in the field of asylum to participating Member States across the EU, the EU has 
passed a series of directives. These contain numerous discretionary clauses leaving 
Member States a wide scope for implementing diverse standards of protection. The 
most recent EU legislation to be passed in the field has neither sufficiently ameliorat-
ed this situation, nor has the European Commission adopted as vigilant an enforce-
ment approach as it has in other legal fields  in relation to the asylum directives where 6
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Member States have failed to properly implement their provisions, or Court judge-
ments relating to them. The EU’s tolerance of this situation suggests it has acquiesced 
to a scope for flexibility outside formally agreed differentiated integration arrange-
ments. 
The chapter begins by examining the current status of formal differentiated integra-
tion in the field of asylum. It then turns to consider the scope for informal flexibility 
and the harmful consequences of the interplay between uneven and mal-implementa-
tion of asylum measures and the Dublin system.  
Formal differentiated integration in the field of asylum  
The current state of play in relation to formal differentiated integration in the field of 
asylum is as follows: The UK, Ireland and Denmark are not participating in the sec-
ond-phase asylum directives on qualification, reception conditions and procedures, 
which apply to all other Member States.  However, the UK and Ireland continue to be 7
bound by the first-phase qualification and procedures directives and the UK remains 
bound by the first-phase reception conditions directive. All Member States are bound 
by the recast Dublin and Eurodac measures, as are some associated countries.  Den8 -
mark is the only Member State not bound by the rules on the refugee fund and the 
asylum support office.     9
In a Protocol to the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam, the UK, Ireland and Denmark secured 
opt-outs from EU treaty provisions on immigration, asylum and civil law. Unlike 
Denmark, which cannot opt in, the British and Irish opt-outs allow for the countries to 
choose whether or not to participate in the discussions on legislation in this area. 
While the UK has cooperated closely on asylum and refugee policy with the other EU 
Member States for many years, the latest developments in British policy suggest that 
a new period characterising the UK’s attitude towards the Common European Asylum 
System has dawned. Maria Fletcher has argued that since the introduction of opt ins 
and outs “into the EU governance armoury at the Maastricht Treaty, the United King-
dom…has exploited the…mechanism as a tool of diversity management to the great-
est extent”.  In practice, with regard to asylum, until recently the UK has opted out of 10
 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on stan7 -
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the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of 
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nearly all proposals concerning visas, borders, and legal migration, but has opted into 
all proposals concerning asylum and civil law and nearly all proposals concerning il-
legal migration.  Tony Blair, in an interview on 25 October 2004 described the UK’s 11
position as follows:  
With the Treaty of Amsterdam seven years ago, we secured the absolute right to opt in to any of the 
asylum and immigration provisions we wanted to in Europe. Unless we opt in, we are not affected by 
it. And what this actually gives us is the best of both worlds.   12
After years of having regularly opted in, the approach of the UK and Ireland has 
changed and their participation in common policies on illegal migration and asylum 
policy has become more selective, something that has been criticised by former Jus-
tice and Home Affairs Commissioner Vitorino, who has argued that opt-outs in this 
area “undermine burden-sharing”.  Not only did the UK government’s recent opt-13
outs go against the advice of the House of Lords European Union Committee,  as 14
well as the UNHCR,  but they have been widely criticised by lawyers, NGOs and 15
academics.  One of the principal reasons for these objections is that the new direc16 -
tives do contain, however limited, provisions which are designed to at least marginal-
ly improve protection of asylum seekers, as discussed below. Furthermore, ILPA has 
noted that the second-phase instruments are intended in part to “strengthen the homo-
geneity and consistency of the determination of claims for international protection 
across the European Union”.  The UNHCR stated that in its view, “the proposed re17 -
cast Directives would contribute to, rather than undermine, the objective of swift and 
fair decision-making in the Member States of the European Union, and would con-
tribute to the reduction of secondary movements between Member States”.  18
The UK’s distancing itself from any further formalisation of asylum norms at the EU 
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level by opting out of the latest phase of asylum directives is problematic for a num-
ber of reasons. First, its continued participation in the Dublin Regulation while opting 
out of the (nevertheless aspirational) level playing field that forms the justification for 
the mutual recognition of asylum decisions is to be questioned, if not in practice, then 
in principle. In 1990 the Dublin Convention was signed,  limiting the number of 19
claims for protection an individual could make to one and establishing a system for 
the allocation of responsibility for asylum applicants between Member States. The 
Convention came into force in 1997. The Dublin Regulation is now the central bind-
ing instrument for the implementation of the ‘safe third country’ concept, which as-
sumes that all EU countries are safe for the purposes of returning asylum seekers, and 
incorporates the Dublin Convention into EU legislation.  The rules for the determina20 -
tion of responsibility for hearing the claims of asylum seekers are premised on the 
notion that responsibility lies with the first Member States with which an asylum ap-
plicant establishes contact, whether by issue of a transit visa, legal presence of a close 
family member, or, in the absence of these, the first physical contact with the 
territory.  Even if the UK’s treatment of asylum seekers is of a standard high enough 21
for it to be considered a so-called safe country for asylum seekers, its refusal to sign 
up to the legally enforceable safeguards that underlie the Dublin system raise ques-
tions as to whether the EU should in principle tolerate such cherry-picking in respect 
of a sensitive area of law that directly affects the lives of vulnerable individuals. 
The UK opted out of the revised asylum measures at a very early stage in the legisla-
tive process. Although the proposals did not meet the UK’s restrictive preferences at 
the time it opted out, the measures were yet to be negotiated and ultimately were wa-
tered down by the Council, despite the European Parliament’s efforts to the contrary. 
One of the reasons the UK ‘exited’ rather than stayed ‘loyal’  to the European asylum 22
legislative project is because of the importance of the notion of discretion in the his-
torical evolution of its asylum regime. While it considers the Dublin and Eurodac 
regulations to be contributing to its ability to administer asylum, it sees the limitation 
of discretion entailed in the asylum directives, their rights-enhancing nature and the 
prospect of increased judicialisation of asylum as posing a challenge to its discre-
tionary purview over its protection regime. The UK considered some of the proposed 
elements as putting in jeopardy its ability to reduce the number of asylum seekers on 
its territory, deter ‘false applicants’ and control its borders. In respect of border con-
trol, we have seen the UK’s reticence most clearly in its opt out of Schengen. The 
 Convention determining the state responsible for examining applications for asylum lodges in one of 19
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 Regulation No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing 20
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an applica-
tion for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a 
stateless person (recast) OJ L180/31 29.6.2013. See further, N. El-Enany, ‘EU Asylum and Immigra-
tion Law Under the Area of Freedom, Security, And Justice’ in A. Arnull and D. Chalmers, The Oxford 
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UK’s treatment of the second phase of asylum directives suggests that it is unwilling 
to consider change that does not accord with its domestic policy agenda. This attitude 
is compounded by its flexible opt out which allows it to retreat from European coop-
eration as and when it pleases.  
Despite the UK’s rejection of the possibility of further legislative cooperation on asy-
lum at the EU level, it has declared itself an active promoter of European collabora-
tion, so long as this is confined to “practical cooperation”.  This is however, neither a 23
comparable nor adequate alternative to legislation which guarantees visible, enforce-
able standards of protection. The Commission has insisted that practical cooperation 
methods “are insufficient, on their own, to adequately and comprehensively address 
the problems which flow from the ambiguities and possibilities for derogations in the 
legislation itself”.  While the other Member States must, whatever the extent of their 24
discomfort with the proposed directives, sit down around the negotiating table, the 
position of the UK is different. For the UK, having an opt out means that in instances 
where it is inclined to be restrictive, it neither has to justify its asylum regime choices 
as reasonable, sensible, moral or defensible, nor to compromise on its individual pref-
erences. 
Discretion and improper implementation as informal flexibility  
Since the emergence of the EU asylum regime, there have been increasing pressures 
for reform, originating both from within the EU governance framework and outside. 
The failings of the first round of asylum directives were seen to have various effects, 
ranging from inbuilt inefficiency to curtailing the rights of those seeking asylum in 
the EU. In 2008, the Commission released a Policy Plan,  which was the product of a 25
public consultation in the form of a Green Paper presented in 2007.  The objective of 26
the Green Paper was to identify ‘“the possible options for shaping the second phase of 
the CEAS”, which was set out in the 2004 Hague Programme as being the creation of 
a common asylum procedure and a uniform status for those granted refugee status or 
subsidiary protection.  The European Council 2010 Stockholm Programme, which 27
followed the Tampere Programme (1999-2003) and the Hague Programme 
 See for example, evidence given by James Brokenshire MP, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 23
State and Minister for Crime Prevention, Home Office, to the House of Lords European Union Com-
mittee, House of Lords European Union Committee, The Treaty of Lisbon: An Impact Assessment: Vol. 
I Report (10th Report, Session 2007-2008), 125-6. 
 European Commission, Staff Working Document Accompanying the Proposal for a Directive of the 24
European Parliament and of the Council on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third 
country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection and the content of the 
protection granted (Recast) – Impact Assessment SEC (2009) 1371, 4. 
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Eco25 -
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions on the ‘Policy Plan on Asylum: An Inte-
grated Approach to Protection Across the EU’ of 17 June 2008 COM(2008) 360. 
 European Commission ‘Green Paper on the future Common European Asylum System’ Brussels, 26
6.6.2007 COM(2007) 301 final.
 The Hague Programme, Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union, Presi27 -
dency Conclusions, Brussels 4/5 November 2004.
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(2004-2009) expressed a commitment to achieve the CEAS by 2012 and noted that 
“[i]t is crucial that individuals, regardless of the Member State in which their applica-
tion for asylum is lodged, are offered an equivalent level of treatment”, but that 
“[t]here are still significant differences between national provisions and their applica-
tion…Common rules, as well as a better and more coherent application of them, 
should prevent or reduce secondary movements within the Union, and increase mutu-
al trust between Member States”.  However, the 2010 Stockholm Programme was 28
concerned primarily with ensuring the “security” of the Union from perceived 
threats,  such as irregular migration. The European Council reiterated the Union’s 29
goal of preventing or reducing “secondary movements” of asylum seekers  and de30 -
scribed the Dublin system as the “cornerstone in building the CEAS”.   31
According to the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, the initial Tampere objectives of creating a 
“uniform status of asylum” to be “valid throughout the Union” are legal obligations.  32
In its 2008 Policy Plan, the Commission reported on three trends it identified through 
statistical analysis and which were to inform developments in asylum policy. The first 
trend was that the Member States, bar “some border States”, were “under less pres-
sure than in the recent past”, leading the Commission to conclude that the time was 
right for working to improve the quality of protection standards in the EU.  Secondly, 33
the Commission reported that despite the achievement of some level of legislative 
harmonisation at the EU level, “a lack of common practice, different traditions and 
diverse country of origin information sources are, among other reasons, producing 
divergent results”. According to the Commission, the differing implementation 
records of the Member States was working against the principle of providing equal 
access to protection in the Union as well as creating secondary movements.  Finally, 34
the Commission found that where individuals are granted protection, an increasing 
number received subsidiary protection or another form of protection based on national 
law rather than refugee status according to the 1951 Refugee Convention. As a result, 
the Commission highlights the importance of paying particular attention to subsidiary 
and other forms of protection during the second phase of the CEAS.  While sub35 -
 The Stockholm Programme, An Open and Secure Europe – Serving and protecting Citizens, OJ C 28
115/1 4.5.2011. 
 See T. Bunyan, Commission Action Plan on the Stockholm Programme: A bit more freedom and jus29 -
tice and a lot more security (Statewatch, 2011). 
 European Council, The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protect30 -
ing Citizens OJ C115/1 2010.
 Ibid. 31
 Article 78 TFEU. See S. Peers, ‘The second phase of the Common European Asylum System: A 32
brave new world - or lipstick on a pig?’ (Statewatch, 8 April 2013), 1. 
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European 33
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Policy Plan on Asylum, An inte-
grated approach to protection across the EU. Brussels 17.6.2008 COM (2008) 360 final, section 1.2.
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sidiary protection has been dealt with in the new directives, the problems associated 
with national forms of protection remain. 
Along with the trends identified by the Commission in its Policy Plan it also reports 
on several shortcomings in relation to the first phase of CEAS legislative instruments. 
In view of these problems, coupled with the concern that the minimum standards de-
limited in the first-phase directives had failed to fulfil the objective of creating a level 
playing field, the Commission expressed its intention to put forward proposed 
amendments to the existing directives as well as to consider the possibility of new in-
struments.  With regard to the Reception Directive, it identified a number of prob36 -
lems “largely due to the discretion allowed to Member States in a number of key ar-
eas”. Thus, the Commission states that the amended version “should contribute to 
achieving a higher degree of harmonisation and improved standards of reception, so 
as to limit the scope of such issues to drive secondary movements”.  The wide dis37 -
cretion left to the Member States is identified as a general problem in relation to the 
first round of asylum directives. The first Procedures Directive was referred to in the 
Policy Plan as allowing for “diverse procedural arrangements”, which along with 
“qualified safeguards” result in “different results when applying common criteria” for 
identifying those in need of protection. This was said to harm “the very objective of 
ensuring access to protection under equivalent conditions across the EU”.  In support 38
of its intention to significantly amend the directive, the Commission referred to the 
TFEU as well as the Hague programme, which both call for the establishment of a 
common asylum procedure.  With regard to the first Qualifications Directive, the 39
Commission reports on the significant variation in the recognition of protection needs 
of applicants from the same countries of origin.  According to the Commission, this 40
is in part due to “the wording of certain provisions” of the Qualifications Directive.   41
In part to deal with these problems, the Commission proposed a set of ‘recast’  leg-
islative proposals in 2008.  The five principal measures comprising the CEAS were 42
 Ibid., section 3. 36
 Ibid., section 3.1. 37
 Ibid., section 3.2. 38
 Ibid. 39
 Ibid., section 3.3. 40
 Ibid.41
 Recasting is a legislative technique used in the EU context whereby in cases where a substantive 42
amendment needs to be made to an existing legal act, the Commission can propose a single legal act 
for adoption, which introduces the desired amendment whilst also codifying that amendment with the 
unchanged provisions of the earlier act and repealing that act. See European Parliament, Council and 
Commission, Interinstitutional Agreement on a more structured use of the recasting technique for legal 
acts of 28 November 2001 (2002/C 77/01) OJ C 77/1 28.3.2002. 
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updated as part of the second phase of the system’s evolution.  Progress made as re43 -
gards protection differs to a minimal extent between each of the second-phase mea-
sures. In general, any progressive change to the first-phase directives is largely the 
result of the influence of the European Parliament, whose success in having its 
amendments adopted varied across the second-phase instruments. 
The Qualifications Directive saw improvements in relation to the rules on qualifica-
tion as a refugee. For instance, the definition of “family members” has been expanded 
to include children who are not dependents,  and allows for the possibility of protec44 -
tion where authorities fail to protect against persecution by non-State actors.  While 45
the second phase directive improves the situation as regards differential treatment be-
tween those granted subsidiary protection as compared with refugee status, Member 
States are still able to discriminate in this regard in relation to the granting of resi-
dence permits and access to social security.  46
Aspects to note regarding improvements made to the Reception Conditions Directive 
relate to the delimiting of measures on detention, accommodation and access to em-
ployment for asylum seekers. In relation to employment, asylum seekers are to be 
granted access to the labour market after nine months of waiting for a first instance 
decision on their asylum claim.  The rules on accommodation have been altered to 47
insist that Member States “take appropriate measures to prevent assault and gender-
based violence, including sexual assault and harassment” when accommodating asy-
lum seekers.  The Directive has been marginally improved through a reduction in 48
 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on stan43 -
dards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of in-
ternational protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, 
and for the content of the protection granted (recast) OJ L 337/9 20.12.2011; Directive 2013/33/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of 
applicants for international protection (recast) OJ L 180/96 26.6.2013; Directive 2013/32/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and 
withdrawing international protection (recast) OJ L 180/60 29.6.13; EU Regulation No 604/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) OJ L 
180/31 29.6.2013; EU Regulation No 603/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 on the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective applica-
tion of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person and on requests for the comparison 
with Eurodac data by Member States' law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement 
purposes, and amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the opera-
tional management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (recast) OJ L 
180/1 29.6.2013.
 Qualifications Directive, Article 2 (j).44
 Ibid., Article 6 (c).45
 Ibid., Article 24 (2) and Article 29 (2). 46
 Reception Conditions Directive, Article 15 (1). 47
 Ibid., Article 18 (4). 48
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grounds for detention  and enhancing conditions  and reducing the possibilities for 49 50
Member States to reduce or withdraw reception conditions.  However, as Peers has 51
pointed out, “the revised Directive does not improve the reception conditions for asy-
lum seekers very significantly, and while Member States face some restrictions as re-
gards the detention of asylum-seekers, they still retain a great degree of discretion”, 
e.g. with regard to detaining asylum seekers, in relation to their giving them access to 
social security and “due to limits on legal aid”, it will be “difficult in practice to chal-
lenge any of these decisions”.  52
The Procedures Directive has seen a number of developments, including improve-
ments in relation to access to asylum procedures. For instance, the Directive intro-
duced a three day time limit for registering new claims.  There is a time limit for the 53
making of a decision on a claim of six months, but this can be extended up to 21 
months under certain conditions.  The Directive introduces a right to an effective 54
remedy where an application for refugee status is refused.  However, several prob55 -
lems with the Directive remain. For example, it is not clear whether the shortened list 
of circumstances in which Member States may accelerate asylum procedures is non-
exhaustive.  If so, as Peers has noted, “the reduction in the list is irrelevant”.  A new 56 57
optional exception has been added to the rules on legal aid that are applicable to ap-
peals whereby Member States may deny legal aid to “applicants who are no longer 
present on their territory”.  58
  
Mal-implementation plagued the initial directives and, in view of the marginal alter-
ations made in the recast versions, is likely to persist as a problem in relation to the 
second phase directives. There will, therefore, continue to be a need for the CJEU to 
clarify Member State obligations under the directives. The Council’s unwillingness to 
be bound in a discretion-free manner to minimum standards of protection which meet 
international and human rights obligations necessitates court rulings on the interpreta-
tion of EU asylum provisions. Indeed, considering the protracted and difficult nature 
of the recent round of negotiations, reliance on the Court is only remaining route to-
ward uniform standards of protection across the Union. Since the agreement of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the CJEU has enjoyed general jurisdiction over the whole of the Area 
 Ibid., Article 8. 49
 Ibid., Article 10. 50
 Ibid., Article 20. 51
 S. Peers, note 32 above, 5. 52
 Procedures Directive, Article 6 (1). 53
 Ibid., Article 31 (3), (4) and (5). 54
 Ibid., Article 46 (1). 55
 Ibid., Article 31 (8). 56
 S. Peers, note 32 above, 15.57
 Procedures Directive, Article 21 (2). 58
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of Freedom, Security and Justice. The preliminary reference procedure is no longer 
limited to national courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial 
remedy, but is available to all national courts.  Arguably, the Court of Justice’s activi59 -
ty in this area has led to some limited legal protection for the rights of individuals. 
This has primarily taken place through the CJEU’s interpretation of substantive provi-
sions of EU law. However, thus far, uniformity and complete application of the asy-
lum directives have not been achieved through the extension of the Court’s jurisdic-
tion.  According the Peers, the problem of mal-implementation: 60
[…]should have been ameliorated somewhat by the increased jurisdiction for the Court of Justice on 
asylum matters following the Treaty of Lisbon, but the increase in its case load has only been modest 
and reportedly a number of Member States’ authorities and courts are finding ways to refuse to imple-
ment the Court’s judgments properly.  61
The lack of sufficient reform as well as the issue of improper implementation is rele-
vant to the subject of differentiated integration. A harmonization project demands at 
least a basic level of commitment among Member States to pull together to create a 
level playing field. However, in the field of asylum, what we see is Member States 
purporting to be in support of a harmonization project, but are reluctant to make alter-
nations to their domestic legal frameworks or indeed cede any significant measure of 
control to the supranational institutions. We have seen that Member States are not 
only dispassionate about adopting exception and discretion-free minimum standards, 
but that they are also reticent about implementing court judgements where these up-
hold an interpretation of the law, or indeed seek to enforce law, that is undesirable to 
Member States. This suggests that if there were more opportunity for Member States 
to be accommodated through formal differentiated integration measures, we might 
find that more follow the example of the UK. According to Peers, reducing “diver-
gences in application of the EU rules” and ensuring “their correct implementation” is 
likely to require the adoption of “further legislation harmonizing standards” as well as 
“new methods of ensuring its implementation, for example a vigorous enforcement 
policy by the Commission, the creation of a common asylum court or joint processing 
of applications”.  62
Although it is indeed the case that a higher degree of harmonisation is needed, it 
seems that Member States will not be willing to embark on a further legislative 
project in the near, or perhaps even distant, future. Having only just emerged from an 
arduously long and fraught legislative process, we can safely assume that the level of 
harmonisation we currently have is the level at which the EU will halt for some time 
to come. It is evident that cooperation in this field will remain an uphill struggle in 
light of the divergence of the views of the Member States, the Commission and in-
 See House of Lords European Union Committee, The Treaty of Lisbon: An Impact Assessment: Vol. I 59
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deed the European Parliament, on what is to be considered a sufficient level of har-
monisation. 
Despite the fact that the second phase directives have now been agreed, the preceding 
years of negotiation and prolonged stalemate are nevertheless revealing of the level of 
cooperation in the EU on asylum matters. As mentioned above, the changes brought 
in by the new directives are overall not significant despite the long wait. The Com-
mission was forced to withdraw its more ambitious earlier proposals for new direc-
tives due to general unwillingness amongst Member States to enhance asylum stan-
dards. Instead, for the most part, we have seen watered down versions adopted in their 
place with the legislative process following the usual pattern: the Council watering 
down the Commission’s semi-ambitious proposal, followed by the European Parlia-
ment’s insertion of some protective measures, some of which were ultimately accept-
ed and some rejected by the Council. 
The incompatibility of differentiated integration with the Dublin system 
At the heart of a harmonisation project is the necessity for the limitation of the discre-
tion of participating Member States to legislate differently in a specific area, and this 
is particularly important with regard to the EU’s asylum project because of the persis-
tence of Dublin’s ‘one chance of asylum’ rule. In view of this it is questionable 
whether any level of formal differentiated integration or informal flexibility should be 
tolerated. The dreadful effects of the interaction between the Dublin system and a 
context of differing levels of reception conditions became apparent in the case of MSS 
v Belgium and Greece, a landmark case in being the first in which the ECtHR has 
held that the transfer of an asylum seeker between two EU countries under the Dublin 
rules was in violation of a series of Convention rights by both the sending and receiv-
ing state. Unlike the case of TI v UK,  where the Court had ruled that the transfer in 63
question was lawful because the asylum seeker would have the opportunity to make a 
new asylum claim in Germany and receive effective protection, this was not the case 
in respect of a transfer from Belgium to Greece. The MSS case concerned an Afghan 
asylum seeker whose first contact with the Union was Greece, but who claimed asy-
lum in Belgium. The Belgian authorities returned the individual to Greece in accor-
dance with the Dublin II Regulation, requesting that Greece accept responsibility for 
the applicant. On arrival, the individual was placed in a detention centre close to 
Athens airport, locked in a small space with 20 other detainees, could only access toi-
lets with the guards’ permission, was not allowed out into the open air, was given very 
little food and forced to sleep on a filthy mattress or on the bare floor.  On his re64 -
lease, the applicant was not provided with accommodation by the authorities and so, 
having no means of subsistence, lived in a park in central Athens.  The Court held 65
that both the conditions in which the applicant was detained and his living circum-
stances outside detention amounted to a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. The 
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applicant had received no assistance from the Greek authorities despite its obligations 
under the EU Reception Directive. The Greek authorities were also held to be in 
breach of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 as a result of their failure to proper-
ly examine the applicant’s asylum claim and the risk he faced in being deported to 
Afghanistan without a full examination of the merits of his case or access to an effec-
tive remedy. Belgium was also held liable for a breach of Convention Article 3 as well 
as Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3. The Court considered that the deplorable 
conditions facing asylum seekers in Greece were well known to the Belgian authori-
ties, citing for example a letter sent to the Belgian Minister for Migration and Asylum 
Policy by the UNHCR two months prior to the individual’s return to Greece in which 
the deficiencies of the asylum procedure in Greece were set out and a recommenda-
tion made to suspend transfers to Greece.  MSS v Belgium and Greece differed from 66
K.R.S v UK  in that at the time the latter was decided there was, according to the EC67 -
tHR, an ‘absence of proof’ that Greece was not complying with its obligations under 
the Reception Directive and Article 3 of the ECHR. The Court therefore decided on 
‘the information available at the time’ to both the UK and itself that sending individu-
als back to Greece was not in violation of the Convention. In MSS v Belgium and 
Greece, the Court drew upon a wealth of documents produced by the UNHCR, the 
European Commissioner for Human Rights, Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch, Pro-Asyl and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, the Greek Hel-
sinki Monitor and the Greek National Commission for Human Rights in order to con-
clude that Greece was not a safe destination country for asylum seekers for the pur-
poses of the Convention and that in returning an individual there, Belgium was in vio-
lation of a number of its provisions.  68
The ECtHR noted in the MSS judgement the problematic way in which the Dublin II 
Regulation functioned. It drew attention to the high proportion of non-EU nationals 
entering the Union through Greece.  Asylum seekers fingerprinted there under the 69
Eurodac system are liable to be returned to Greece for processing. Although Greece 
was criticised for not having a proper and functioning asylum procedure or adequate 
detention and accommodation facilities, the ECtHR expressed concern that Greece 
was under significant pressure. It stated as follows: 
…States which form the external borders of the European Union are currently experiencing consider-
able difficulties in coping with the increasing influx of migrants and asylum seekers. The situation is 
exacerbated by the transfers of asylum seekers by other Member States in application of the Dublin 
Regulation. The Court does not underestimate the burden and pressure this situation places on the 
States concerned, which are all in the present context of economic crisis. 
The Court regards the Dublin system as aggravating the situation by increasing pres-
sures on border states such as Greece. Indeed, as part of the reform package prepared 
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by the Commission and proposed in 2008, it had put forward a proposal to redraft the 
Dublin Regulation.  70
The case of MSS has influenced the Court of Justice of the European Union judgment 
in the case of NS.  The case deals with an Afghan asylum seeker’s challenge of a de71 -
cision taken by UK authorities to return him to Greece in accordance with the Dublin 
Regulation. The Court held that an asylum seeker cannot be returned to a country 
where there is a serious risk her rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
will be violated, which may require setting aside the Dublin rules on the allocation of 
responsibility for asylum claims between Member States. While it was asserted that 
the EU’s obligations under the ECHR and the Refugee Convention meant that the 
Dublin rules did not in principle breach the Charter, where a country such as Greece 
failed to comply with its human rights obligations leading to a situation of a serious 
risk of breach of an individual’s rights under the Charter, transfer under the Dublin 
regulation would be incompatible with the Charter. The overloading of the Greek asy-
lum system created a serious risk of breach of Articles 1 (right to dignity), 4 (freedom 
from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment) 18 (respect for the 
rules of the Refugee Convention) and 19(2) (non-refoulement) of the Charter. There-
fore, the UK’s irrebuttable presumption that all Member States are safe for asylum 
seekers is in breach of the EU Charter, while a rebuttable presumption is permissible 
(para. 178). Breaches of a Member State’s obligations under EU law which did not 
violate human rights obligations would not however demand a suspension of the 
Dublin rules. However, Steve Peers has noted that, “[g]iven the close connection be-
tween the EU asylum legislation and fundamental rights obligations, it will not always 
be easy to establish whether a Member State is ‘merely’ breaching EU legislation, or 
is also breaching the Charter”.  72
While the Court of Justice agreed with the ECtHR that the operation of the Dublin 
Regulation should be limited in the case of systematic deficiencies in the asylum sys-
tems of receiving Member States amounting to a real risk of a breach of Article 3 
ECHR and the corresponding provision, Article 4, in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, the Court of Justice made clear that this was exceptional and that not all in-
fringements of fundamental rights will affect Member States’ other obligations under 
the Dublin Regulation.  Since this case, the ECtHR has amplified its standard of pro73 -
tection, insisting that States party to the ECHR make an individual assessment of of 
the level of human rights protection in receiving EU countries when implementing 
Dublin transfers.  In its recent Opinion that the agreement on the EU’s accession to 74
the ECHR was incompatible with primary EU law, the CJEU argued that the principle 
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of mutual trust, as exemplified by the Dublin system, does not allow for individual 
assessment of other countries’ behaviour except in the narrowly defined circum-
stances of the NS case. Bruno de Witte and Sejla Imamovic have argued that the 
Court’s argument “boils down to a claim that EU law should be allowed to give less 
protection than the Convention requires to certain rights in certain circumstances: 
namely, to the rights at stake in mutual recognition situations in the area of freedom, 
security and justice”.    75
ECRE has stated that ‘the Dublin system’s harmful effects go beyond those caused by 
the currently imperfect CEAS,’ and calls for the system to be dismantled and replaced 
with one based on free choice of the asylum applicant as to which state examines her 
claim.  The disastrous effects of the interplay between the workings of the Dublin 76
system in a context of differing levels of reception conditions was made clear in the 
case of MSS v Belgium and Greece. Different levels of protection across the Member 
States ‘produce an “asylum lottery” in the EU’.  ECRE reports that 2005 recognition 77
rates for Chechens varied from approximately 0 per cent in Slovakia to 90 per cent in 
Austria. The problem is also significant in the case of Iraqis with 2007 recognition 
rates showing an 87.5 per cent success rate in Cyprus, 85 per cent in Germany, 82 per 
cent in Sweden, 30 per cent in Denmark, 13 per cent in the UK and 0 per cent in 
Slovenia and Greece.  With these figures in mind, depriving asylum seekers of the 78
choice of where to seek asylum in the EU on the premise that they receive the same 
treatment across the Member States seems ludicrous. ECRE has warned that ‘Lack of 
equal protection can create a real risk of refoulement, and thus of failing to conform to 
international legal obligations’.  The contribution of the Dublin system to the pres79 -
sure on border states creates the risk that these states will work to limit access to their 
territories or to asylum procedures.  There is also the danger that asylum seekers will 80
try to avoid being transferred or even escape the asylum system altogether.  In this 81
way the Dublin system can transform ‘a visible flow of asylum seekers into a covert 
movement of irregular migrants that is even more difficult for states to count and con-
trol’.  Jonathan Aus has noted the ‘immediate reaction’ of asylum seekers seeking 82
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protection in Nordic countries to Eurodac, which as discussed above is designed to 
complement the Dublin System by requiring the fingerprinting of all asylum seekers 
on entry in order to enable transfers, has been to ‘deliberately cut or burn their finger-
tips…A member of the Swedish Migration Board reported “scars from knives and ra-
zors, or entire [fingerprint] patterns that are entirely destroyed because they’ve used 
acid or some other kind of product to destroy their hands”’.  83
The Dublin system is indefensible in a context which lacks full harmonisation. It is 
simply not compatible with a system that does not include the following: all Member 
States participating in Dublin sign up to providing the same high level of protection to 
all asylum applicants (including in reception, procedures and recognition rates, etc,); 
all Member States actually provide this protection in practice. Neither of these condi-
tions are satisfied at present. The UK has opted out of the second phase of asylum di-
rectives, but in to the Dublin and Eurodac regulations. Implementation remains a seri-
ous problem across the board, with Greece providing an example of a country simply 
unable to deal with the volume of applicants it receives.  
Despite the case law of the European courts, the focus in amending the Dublin Regu-
lation was enhancing the efficiency of the system, rather than increasing protection 
standards. This is despite the fact that system has long been in need of a complete 
overhaul, or indeed abolition, considering its effect of placing a hugely disproportion-
ate burden on Southern European States, which are struggling to manage arrivals and 
facing significant economic challenges. The Dublin system has led “to significant 
human rights abuses”,  acknowledged by the European courts. In spite of this, “radi84 -
cal reform of Dublin rules was never seriously considered”.  Minor improvements 85
include the rules on detention, which ban detention of an asylum seeker merely be-
cause the Regulation is applicable.  An exception is stipulated in cases where there is 86
a “significant risk of absconding” enabling Member States to detain an asylum seeker 
where there are “reasons in an individual case, which are based on objective criteria 
defined by law, to believe that an applicant or a third- country national or a stateless 
person who is subject to a transfer procedure may abscond”.  In such cases, detention 87
must be “proportional and other less coercive alternative measures cannot be applied 
effectively”  and detention must “be for as short a period as possible”.  88 89
 J. P. Aus, ‘Eurodac: A Solution Looking for a Problem? European Integration Online Papers Vol. 10 83
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The revised Dublin Regulation codifies the decision of the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union in NS and ME  with regard to the suspension of transfers,  but the 90 91
Commission failed to have its proposed formal procedure for suspension adopted. 
Nevertheless, the European Parliament was successful in influencing changes to the 
new rules on a mechanism for early warning and crisis management, which includes 
an express reference to the fundamental rights of asylum seekers.  Peers has noted 92
that had the Commission’s proposal to suspend the Dublin system in instances of hu-
man rights abuse been successful, this would “not have fixed the underlying illness, 
but only treated the symptoms”, and yet “even that proposal was rejected by the 
Council”.  The result is that “[a]ny significant change in the Dublin rules will there93 -
fore remain – as with the first-phase Regulation – in the hands of the courts”.  94
The Eurodac Regulation, which obliges the taking of fingerprints of all asylum seek-
ers and individuals who cross the external borders of Member States irregularly, prin-
cipally for the purpose of enabling the operation of the Dublin system, has seen a 
number of changes in the second phase instrument. The most significant amendment 
is that national law enforcement agencies as well as Europol are granted access to the 
database.  Peers has warned that this “risks stigmatising large categories of foreign 95
citizens, including those whose refugee and subsidiary protection status has been 
recognised”.  96
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that differentiated integration, neither in the form of official 
agreements, nor in the form of informal flexibility, should be tolerated in the field of 
asylum. Formal differentiated integration arrangements have enabled the UK to adopt 
a cherry-picking approach to participation in the CEAS. While the UK has opted into 
the Dublin system, it has opted out of the second phase directives which comprise 
legally enforceable minimum standards designed to reduce differences in protection 
standards across the Union. However, the asylum directives, in their allowing Mem-
ber States a wide scope of discretion in interpretation and application are themselves 
productive of informal flexibility. There remain vast differences in practice between 
Member States in their treatment of asylum seekers, for instance in relation to recog-
nition as refugees. This is compounded by the Commission’s lack of vigilance as re-
gards enforcement of the directives coupled with Member States’ unwillingness to 
properly implement CJEU rulings. Asylum is a field which directly affects the lives of 
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vulnerable individuals and is heavily regulated by international and human rights 
norms. In view of this, it has been argued that there should be no provision for formal 
and informal flexibility. This tension created by existing formal and informal flexibili-
ty arrangements puts in question the integrity of the CEAS in its accommodation of a 
situation of no equivalence of protection across Member States despite the persistence 
of the Dublin ‘one chance of asylum’ rule. 
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